UCC Sales: Lawrence Condensed Outline Sorted by UCC Code
UCC: Sales
Professor Lawrence
I.
CONTRACT FORMATION AND
ENFORCEABILITY
A.
Scope of Article 2 and Article 2A
a.
§2-102:
This article applies to transactions in goods.
c.
§2-103:
Definitions and index of definitions
d.
§2-105(1):
Definition of “Goods”
e.
§2-501:
Identification of goods
3.
Foster v.
Colorado Radio Corporation
6.
Wivagg v.
Duquesne Light Co.
7.
Glen Dick
Equipment Co. v. Galey Construction, Inc.
9.
Goods to be
Severed from the Land
2.
§2-204:
Contract Formation in General
3.
§2-206:
Offer and Acceptance in Formation of
Contracts
4.
§2-204:
Formation in General
1.
§2-201:
Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds (SOF)
f.
§1-201(37)
General definitions—“signed”
g.
§2-104(1)—definition “Merchant”
A.
Express Agreement; Parole Evidence Rule; Interpretation
1.
§1-201(b)(3):
General
Definitions—“Agreement”
2.
§1-201(b)(12):
General
Definitions—“Contract”
3.
§2-202:
Final or Written Expression: Parol or Extrinsic Evidence
d.
Terms may be
explained or supplemented.
B.
Trade Usage, Course of Dealing, & Course of Performance
b.
§ 1-303(e)
includes a hierarchy provision.
5.
Columbia
Nitrogen v. Royster
6.
Southern
Concrete Services v. Mableton Contractors
3.
§1-302(a)—UCC provisions varied by agreement
4.
§2-301:
General Obligations of Parties
b.
§2-319:
F.O.B. and F.A.S. Terms
5.
§2-309
Absence of specific time provitions
6.
§2-308
Absence of place of delivery
7.
§2-503(1)-(3) Manner of seller’s
tender of delivery
9.
§2-513(1),(2) Buyer’s right to inspection of goods
D.
Supereminent Contract Terms
4.
§1-302(b) Variation by
Agreement
7.
§1-304
Obligation of Good Faith
1.
§2-509 Risk
of Loss in Absence of Breach
2.
§2-503(1)
Manner of Seller’s Tender of Delivery
7.
2-103(1)(c)
“Receipt of Goods”
8.
Eberhard
Manufacturing Case:
B.
Effect of Breach on Risk of Loss
1.
§2-510
Effect of Breach on Risk of Loss
2.
§2-314
Implied Warranty; Merchantibility
3.
§2-315
Implied warranty: Fitness for a particular purpose
4.
§2-312
Warranty of Title Against Infringement
1.
§2-318 Third
party beneficiaries of Warranties
1.
§2-316
Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
b.
2-316(1)-Disclaimers of express warranties
2.
Dorman v.
International Harvest Case:
2.
§2-719
Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy
3.
§2-301
General Obligations of Parties
4.
§2-606 What
Constitutes Acceptance of Goods
5.
§2-607
Effect of Acceptance
6.
2-709(1)—
Action for the price
7.
Zabrinksi
Chevrolet v. Smith
3.
§2-601—Perfect Tender (remember right to cure)
i.
Doctrine of
substantial performance.
4.
§2-602
Manner and Effect of Rightful Rejection
5.
§2-603
Merchant Buyer’s Duties as to Rejected Goods
6.
§2-604
Buyer’s Options as to Salvage of Rejected Goods
7.
§2-605
Waiver of Buyer’s Objections by failure to Particularize
8.
§2-508
Cure by Seller of Improper Tender or Delivery; Replacement
9.
§1-304
Obligation of Good Faith
10.
§2-612
Installment Contract breach
12.
Myron v.
Yonkers Raceway Case: 3 legged race horse.
13.
Shaken Faith
Doctrine (affecting cure)
1.
§2-608
Revocation of Performance
2.
§2-607(2)
Effect of Acceptance
D.
Breach and Impaired Expectations
3.
§2-609 Right
to Adequate Assurance of Performance
4.
§2-610
Anticipatory Repudiation
5.
§2-611
Retraction of Anticipatory Repudiation
6.
§2-612(3)
Installment Contract Breach
7.
§2-703
Seller’s Remedies in General
8.
§2-711
Buyer’s remedies in General
a.
§2-712
Cover—Buyer’s procurement of substitute goods
2.
Market
Price/Contract Price Differential
a.
§2-713
Buyer’s damages for non delivery or repudiation
3.
When Buyer
Accepts the Goods
a.
§2-714
Buyer’s damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted Goods
4.
Incidental
and Consequential Damages
a.
§2-715
Buyer’s incidental and Consequential Damages
a.
§2-716
Buyer’s right to specific performance
a.
§2-706
Seller’s resale Including K for resale
2.
Contract
Price/Market Price Differential
a.
§2-708(1)
Seller’s damages for non acceptance or repudiation
a.
§2-709
Action for the price
a.
§2-710
Seller’s incidental damages
**Remember:
Article I is
the general provisions, all of these definitions apply to all of the articles.
I.
CONTRACT
FORMATION AND ENFORCEABILITY
A.
Scope of Article
2 and Article 2A
1.
Article 2
applies to transactions in goods
a.
“Goods” is a
term of art within article 2, which means you use the definition that the
drafters have provided.
2.
Critical
determination, does this statute apply?
What is the scope of the statute?
a.
§2-102:
This article applies to transactions in goods.
i.
A “sale”
consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price.
This is how a sale is distinguished from a lease.
ii.
contract,
agreement, limited to the present and future sale of goods
iii.
Article 2
can apply to future goods, i.e. it applies to goods yet to be manufactured,
including specially manufactured goods.
c.
§2-103:
Definitions and index of definitions
d.
§2-105(1):
Definition of “Goods”
e.
§2-501:
Identification of goods
f.
§2-104(1):
Merchant
3.
Foster v.
Colorado Radio Corporation
a.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale of a group of assets, some of which are non-goods, but
others of which are statutory goods is subject to the provisions of UCC article
2.
b.
This
bifurcation approach is not utilized that often.
Look at which state you are litigating and look at cases closely and
develop argument carefully.
4.
That does
not mean to say that courts will only apply article 2 to a sales transaction.
Any statutory provision, if the provisions are right, might be applied by
analogy, but that is a sophisticated argument to develop.
5.
What do I
have to do to get the court to apply provisions of article 2 by analogy?
a.
Establish
that transaction itself is analogous to a sale.
b.
Alternative
approach is to address the policy implications under article 2, and ascertain
whether or not that particular provision should be applied to the case at hand.
6.
Wivagg v.
Duquesne Light Co.
a.
ISSUE:
Whehter the courts will imply a warranty of fitness or merchantability in
a sales-service hybrid transaction.
b.
What was the
policy that underlies an implied warranty of merchantability under article 2?
Does this make sense to apply to electric?
Yes.
c.
COURT:
The imposition of warranty liability upon Duquesne Light flows naturally
from its position of total responsibility for its electrical service.
7.
Glen Dick
Equipment Co. v. Galey Construction, Inc.
a.
ISSUE:
Whether Article 2 of the UCC should be extended to this lease
transaction.
b.
COURT: A
lease transaction is analogous to a sales transaction.
c.
The lease of
a golf cart was very much like the sale of a golf cart, and the analogy is not
rebutted by additional circumstances.
a.
This case
focuses solely on the question of which law should be applicable to govern
software licensing, Article 2, or the common law.
b.
Professor:
Article 2 does not govern this transaction because it is for a license
agreement, and is not a sale of goods. The
Court doesn’t even try to make an argument.
The Court is simply going to assume that Article 2 applies.
How do they rationalize? Law
or article 2, is more consistent with the expectations o the parties at the time
they entered into the contract.
This is a huge problem area.
9.
Goods to be
Severed from the Land
i.
states that,
“Goods” also includes…growing crops and other identified things attached to
realty as described in the section on goods to be severed from realty (§ 2-107).
i.
Goods to be
severed from the land
c.
In order for
UCC §2-107(1) to apply, the seller
must remove the good from the land.
A sale of minerals, or a structure or its materials…
d.
UCC
§2-107(2)
everything
not named in UCC §2-107(1), does not
depend on whether or not the buyer or the seller severs.
e.
Distinction:
i.
If it is
growing from the ground, the buyer or the seller can sever.
ii.
If it has to
be extracted from under the ground, the seller must sever.
10.
Rev. §1-103:
Construction of UCC to promote its purposes and policies
a.
The UCC must
be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and
policies.
b.
Contract
formation was probably not the motivating and driving force behind article 2.
Article 2 is not the exclusive body of law governing contracts
specifically.
c.
Unless a
Code provision displaces a principle of law or equity, however, those principles
are equally relevant to transactions covered by the Code.
1.
Why so
little sections on formation?
a.
There is a
lot of law in the common law. It
would be tough to codify all the holdings of contract law and reduce it to
several provisions.
2.
§2-204:
Contract Formation in General
a.
How is a
contract for the sale of goods formed?
Are offer and acceptance required?
b.
According to
§2-204 of the UCC, a contract for
the sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement.
On its face the UCC does not require offer and acceptance per se, as long
as there is an agreement.
3.
§2-206:
Offer and Acceptance in Formation of
Contracts
a.
If S sends a
telegram to B offering to sell B specified goods, does B have to respond by
telegram in order to accept? By a
means of transmission at least as fast as telegram service?
i.
No,
according to UCC § 2-206(1)(a), “an offer to make a contract shall be construed
as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the
circumstances.”
ii.
As long as
the medium which the buyer chooses is deemed as ‘reasonable’ then there is offer
and acceptance.
b.
If an
offeror indicates that an acceptance must be by a return promise by telephone to
the offeror in two days, can the offeree nevertheless create a contract by other
means?
i.
If the terms
of the contract are unambiguously indicated by the language of the
circumstances, then no, offeree cannot create a contract by other means.
§2-206(1)
ii.
Offeror has
unambiguously indicated. What if
these two parties have dealt with each other in the past and the buyer never
complies and never pays any attention to the two day limitation and the seller
always goes along with it. The
circumstances do not suggest that this is an unambiguous demand
4.
§2-204:
Formation in General
a.
The UCC has
liberalized the requirements for contract formation.
b.
Does a
contract for the sale of goods fail if the parties do not specify the price to
be paid for the goods?
i.
Not
necessarily, §2-204(3), a contract will not fail for indefiniteness.
ii.
Must
convince the court of two things:
1.
The parties
intended to make a contract
2.
There is a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
The court has to have an appropriate basis for determining what the term
is.
5.
§2-205
Firm Offers
a.
The issue
has to do with irrevocable offers by the seller.
b.
For the most
part the seller who extends an offer maintains a power of revocation.
c.
When you
extend an offer of which you know is likely to lead to detrimental reliance, the
power to revoke the bid is extended for a reasonable amount of time to give the
offeree a chance to accept.
d.
§2-205
Firm Offers
i.
Under the
UCC a firm offer can only apply to
an offer from a merchant. See
§2-104 for the definition of
“merchant.”
ii.
A firm offer
must be a signed writing, see §1-201
for the definition of a writing.
iii.
A firm offer
is not valid if it exceeds 3 months.
iv.
Any such
term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by
the offeror.
6.
Cases
Ask professor if we can omit these cases because they fall under 2-207.
a.
Hill v. Gateway
i.
Under the Hill court’s view, where was the acceptance?
Acceptance occurs when the consumer fails to return it within the
allotted 30 days. Easterbrook is
just outcome driven on this one.
ii.
What is the practical effect of Easterbook’s holding?
1.
Even though you have a contract already, the seller gets to unilaterally add
terms to the agreement. And most of
these terms are not going to be favorable to you and you will be left between a
rock and a hard place.
b.
Klocek v. Gateway
c.
Klocek v. Gateway
d.
Specht v. Netscape
a.
2-209 is the
modification provision.
Modification needs no consideration to be
binding. 2-209(1), no
consideration, consideration is not an element involved with a modification.
You must be very careful to refer to comment 2.
It says that modifications there under must use good faith.
1.
§2-201:
Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds (SOF)
a.
§2-201
is a substantial departure from common law requirement to include material
terms.
b.
Failure to
include price does not cause contract to fail.
c.
The only
requirement you have to have is a quantity term.
d.
This does
not require that all of the terms of the agreement be in writing. It does not
even require that all express terms be in writing. All that is explicitly
required for an effective writing is:
i.
the
signature of the party against whom
enforcement is sought (or his authorized agent or broker);
1.
Doesn’t have
to be signature exactly. Can be symbol, letterhead, printed name, etc.
2.
UETA
(Uniform Electronic Transactions Act)
3.
Electronic
signatures are OK
4.
Computerized
contracting, where one person’s computer contracts w/ another. This can form a
contract even though no one reviews the contract or its terms. One can’t use the
defense that machines can’t make contracts, b/c the fact that you programmed the
machine is your manifestation of assent.
5.
E-Sign Act
– provides that the documents are legally effective even though the electronic
signature is not in paper format.
ii.
sufficient information to identify the
parties and show that a contract for
sale exists between them;
iii.
a quantity term;
1.
The quantity
term requirement is not stated in the rule, but was implied by the courts.
2.
A contract
will not be enforced beyond the quantity shown in the writing.
3.
The reason
why quantity is so important (but not price) is that quantity varies more than
price (which can be gap-filled by court). Also, quantity also affects the price
(Costco style).
iv.
Description of the item
(hereafter added by Prof. Lawrence) – since SOF only applies to sale of goods, a
description will indicate that we are dealing w/
goods;
AND
v.
Must suggest that this is a sales
transaction.
1.
What happens
instead of “sold two machines to
2.
This is not
a sale of goods, article 2 does not apply.
e.
How the SOF
Works in Litigation
i.
2-201 is
extremely limited in what it seeks to accomplish.
ii.
Must make
this assertion early before parties start getting into testimony.
iii.
If you plead
SOF and win, the case is over. The
contract is not enforceable.
f.
§1-201(37)
General definitions—“signed”
g.
§2-104(1)—definition “Merchant”
A.
Express Agreement; Parole Evidence Rule; Interpretation
1.
§1-201(b)(3):
General
Definitions—“Agreement”
a.
What was the
deal between the parties. What did
the parties promise each other, what was the totality of their communications,
what was their conduct?
2.
§1-201(b)(12):
General
Definitions—“Contract”
a.
This becomes
the total legal package. There are
a lot of agreements that aren’t enforceable.
3.
§2-202:
Final or Written Expression: Parol or Extrinsic Evidence
a.
If a writing
is final, it cannot be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement
(including both oral and written agreements) or any contemporaneous oral
agreement, but it can be supplemented by evidence of consistent additional
terms.
b.
You can’t
contradict an integrated agreement.
c.
If those
terms of writing are considered to be final by the parties, you can’t introduce
evidence to contradict those terms.
d.
Terms may be
explained or supplemented.
|
Partial Integration |
Complete Integration |
Add To |
Yes |
No |
Contradict |
No |
No |
e.
Just because
parties reduce a contract to a written agreement, doesn’t mean they intended a
full integration or what they wrote.
f.
The Code
Test for Completeness
i.
Parole
evidence rule in 2-202 does not say anything about the standard to be used to
infer what the actual intention was, but it does state a standard in the
comments.
ii.
Comment 3,
certainly included test: unless the term would “certainly” have been included in
the writing, extrinsic evidence goes to the jury.
This is a higher standard.
Gives the courts an out.
B.
Trade Usage, Course of Dealing, & Course of Performance
1.
TU, CD, CP,
can be used to interpret terms in a contract.
b.
Corollary
concept would have been the concept of custom, but this is pretty limiting.
We now speak in terms of trade usage, it is something that business
people practice. A trade usage, by
being members of the trade, they know and will observe these particular
practices, unless they agree to the contrary.
Can’t be unilateral. I.e. if
a tourist buys an item from a store, and the store has a policy that the item
can only be returned for store credit, the store needs to make the tourist aware
of this. The store cannot rely on
the fact that all other stores in the tourist business do this.
a.
not flowing
from the fact that both are members or a trade, they are going to flow from a
sequence of conduct between the parties.
Must show that it is not the first time we have entered into a contract
like this. Must look for prior relevant contracts between the two parties.
How does the legitimate expectation arise?
We have 10 previous agreement just like this, and now you are trying to
pull the plug over the contract.
This is a much narrow scale.
a.
narrower
still, like course of dealing, like a sequence of conduct, now instead of being
based on a prior series of comparable contracts, we are talking about a sequence
of conduct under this contract.
Probably looking at an installment contract.
Repeated performance by a party.
4.
What if
there is a contradiction between an express term and TU, CD, or CP?
a.
You can’t
contradict a final term in an integrated agreement, but you can use it to
supplement consistent additional terms.
b.
§ 1-303(e)
includes a hierarchy provision.
i.
Express
terms prevail over everything
ii.
Course of
performance prevails over CD, TU
iii.
Course of
dealing prevails over TU
iv.
Trade usage
is at the end
c.
What
controls is the term that the parties intended to control.
d.
1-303(e)
- if you can’t make a reasonable construction to reconcile express term and
trade usage, express terms prevail.
5.
a.
6.
Southern
Concrete Services v.
a.
Southern
concrete suggest no terms can come in if they contradict express terms.
These are the two polar problems.
It is a really difficult area with an aweful lot of bad case law on this
and the drafters are at fault.
7.
Columbia
Nitrogen
and Southern Concrete were decided on comparable fact patterns and they
represent polar extremes with regard to trade usage and express terms.
1.
Gap filler
is a term that is the standardized statutory term.
2.
There are a
number of provisions in article 2 that we refer to as gap fillers.
3.
§1-302(a)—UCC provisions varied by agreement
a.
“Except as
otherwise provided in this subsection (b) or elsewhere in the UCC, the effect of
provisions of the UCC may be varied by agreement.”
4.
§2-301:
General Obligations of Parties
a.
“The
obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the buyer is to
accept and pay in accordance with the contract.”
b.
§2-319:
F.O.B. and F.A.S. Terms
c.
§2-319
governs the general meaning of what FOB will mean, unless the parties agree
otherwise.
5.
§2-309
Absence of specific time provitions
a.
The gap
filler on time is 2-309.
b.
“Reasonable
time” doesn’t help me that much.
c.
§1-205(a).
Whether it is reasonable depends on the nature, purposes, and
circumstances of the action. That
is it as far as the statutory terms; it is kind of a broad standard.
d.
You need to
be real careful under §2-309, you need to understand that the comments,
specifically 5 and 6 expand substantially from what is in the provision.
6.
§2-308
Absence of place of delivery
a.
The gap
filler for specified place for delivery.
7.
§2-503(1)-(3) Manner of seller’s
tender of delivery
a.
§2-503
is the section with respect to manner of delivery in a destination contract.
b.
§2-503(1):
Sales you generally engage in yourself, i.e.
You go to Vons and you buy your groceries.
This doesn’t cover face to face transaction, 2-503-1 does.
a.
§2-319(1)(a)
is how we trigger §2-504
b.
§2-504
is not drafted as well as it should be, but courts have no problem with it.
c.
Read as put
the conforming goods in the hands of the carrier.
Make an appropriate contract for the carriage of goods by the carrier,
and notify the buyer that this is done.
9.
§2-513(1),(2) Buyer’s right to inspection of goods
a.
2-513
cross-reference to section 3.
C.O.D. parties must agree on this.
a.
“payment is
due at the time and place at which the buyer is to receive the goods even though
the place of shipment is the place of delivery;”
a.
2-305 is a
pricing term, appropriate remedy, reasonable price AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY.
If you can’t comply with the provisions of 2-305 then the contract may
fail for indefiniteness.
a.
Requirements
or output contracts. Commit to buy
from you exclusively. Rememeber
2-201(1). What happens with SOF in
a requirements contract? This
satisfies the quantity requirement, it is not a precise quantitiy, but it is a
measurable quantity under 2-306.
D.
Supereminent Contract Terms
1.
Typically,
if parties don’t like particular provisions, they can agree otherwise.
2.
There are
certain fundamental principles, however, that cannot be disclaimed.
3.
You cannot
use express terms, CD, CP, or TU to get around it.
4.
§1-302(b)
Variation by Agreement
a.
Unconcsionability is never a jury issue.
It is not an issue of fact.
Unconcsionability is purely a decision for the court to make.
b.
Unconsiconable at the time it was made.
i.
Court should
not find something to be unconscionable just because events have changed.
c.
As applied
by the courts 2-302 has not been a very good weapon for merchants.
It is very difficult to convince courts to apply a claim based on 2-302
in favor of a businessperson.
d.
Poor,
uneducated, disadvantaged are the most successful.
e.
Procedural
and substantive aspects of unconcsionability.
i.
Procedural
is basically improper bargaining.
Buyer’s inability to read, lack of education, fine print, designing the language
so that it appears to communicate on one thing, etc.
ii.
Substantive,
what did we end up with. Overly
harsh terms. I.e. if you forfeit
this contract, you will give me your first born child.
a.
“Good
faith,” except as otherwise provided in Article 5, means honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.
b.
Good faith
does not apply to the negotiation, only to its enforcement and performance.
7.
§1-304
Obligation of Good Faith
a.
Every
contract or duty within the UCC imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance and enforcement.
a.
“Good faith”
in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.
1.
§2-509 Risk
of Loss in Absence of Breach
a.
§2-509(a)
is the shipment contract.
b.
§2-509(b)
is destination contract.
c.
Same results
on ROL allocation under §2-319(1)(a)(b)
as §2-509.
d.
Why do we
have them both? Because
§2-319 is an Express Term and
§2-509 is a gap filler.
Distinction is the source of the contract.
2.
§2-503(1)
Manner of Seller’s Tender of Delivery
a.
§2-504
is going to have relevance for §2-503(2),
and also will have relevance for
§2-509(1)(a).
a.
What are the
consequences of ROL? If ROL has
passed to the buyer, the buyer is obligated to pay the price of those goods.
7.
2-103(1)(c)
“Receipt of Goods”
8.
Eberhard
Manufacturing
Case:
a.
Carrier
never tendered delivery of goods to me.
There was an express term that indicated where the goods were to be sent,
it said ship the goods to my client in Burmingham.
The court says no, the instructions on where to ship the goods is not
sufficient for a destination contract.
b.
Law will
always imply shipment. Destination
contract imposes considerably greater obligations on the seller.
Can’t implicitly impose this on the seller.
Only way to impose is through agreement, i.e. express terms, CD, CP, TU.
a.
The issue
before the court is whether or not the risk of loss has passed.
b.
Provision to
govern ROL has to come out of 2-509.
c.
2-509(1)-(3)
are the gap fillers. (1) out, there
is no authority whatsoever. (2)
Not a bailee, a seller. So
we are in the residual provision.
2509(3)—Merchant standards, receipt means actual physical possession, clearly
the buyer was never placed in actual physical possession.
Seller is selling used equipment.
Can quality as a merchant, see definition, hold themselves to have
special knowledge, etc. Using
non-merchant standard when they will probably he held to the merchant standard.
Even if they are not considered a merchant, they will still fail because
they did not hold the goods on the buyers disposition.
This is a real weak case.
a.
Seller,
selling mobile homes, and buyer purchases.
Comes to the seller’s lot and the buyer agrees to purchase it.
Buyer would take possession, but he was called away on business.
Before buyer can pick it up, somebody steals the Mobile home.
What was the first argument with respect to ROL that the court says that
the plaintiff seller advanced?
2-509(2). Applicable ROL provisions
is 2-509(2)(b), I held the good so that I was a gratuitous bailee.
Drafters are clearly after an independent true 3rd party
bailee.
b.
2nd
Argument, ROL goes to the buyer by an express term in contract.
Apply express provision that was in the contract.
Court, language used here is not clear enough.
Clause to affix responsibility of loss on buyer, after buyer had taken
possession. Court:
Your interpretation is nothing more than a trap for an unwary buyer.
Prof likes the reasoning in this case.
Courts are very consistent, they say, yes you can pass ROL, but we need
clear and convincing evidence.
c.
What is the
applicable legal standard to 2-509?
2-509(c), seller a merchant, so risk of
loss stays with him until physical delivery occurs.
B.
Effect of Breach on Risk of Loss
1.
§2-510
Effect of Breach on Risk of Loss
a.
if the buyer
or seller has breached. Doesn’t say
if parties breach, says effect of breach on ROL.
If a party breaches it may or may not have a ROL impact.
b.
It may or it
may not change that risk around from what it otherwise may be.
c.
1), and (2)
is breach by the seller. (3) is the
only section that covers the effect of breach by the buyer.
d.
Subsection
(2):
i.
-contract
obligation on the buyer is to accept the goods.
ii.
If the buyer
refuses to accept conforming goods, it is a breach for the buyer to reject.
e.
Revoke
Acceptance. If you do not actually
reject within a reasonable period of time you will have waived the right and
legally accepted. This is
pre-contractual.
a.
Why we are
in 2-510, instead of 2-509? It’s a
breach. Obligation of the buyer is
two-fold. Buyer has the obligation
to pay for the goods and also to ACCEPT the goods.
That is where the seller screwed up here, the acceptance.
b.
ROL will
stay on the buyer, but only for a commercially reasonably time.
What is the purpose of this requirement?
What constitutes a standard of commercial reasonably time?
This is the question the court has to grapple with.
The time is reasonably necessary
to obtain insurance. Risk of
loss is on the buyer, you can’t just leave the buyer on the hook indefinitely.
The buyer is on the hook for the breach, but not for the loss.
The seller should insure them.
Do you think it takes more than 5 weeks to get proper insurance?
Wasn’t an out an out repudiation, it was continual ongoing delays.
Commercially reasonable time seems to be a really short period of time.
c.
Multiplastics isn’t only the best analysis, but it one of the few analysis’s.
What are the drafters talking about when they use that commercially
reasonable criteria in this section.
a.
2-313(2),
what words are sufficient for purposes of any contract?
Words or act that would reasonably lead the other party to believe…
FROM THE SELLER TO THE BUYER
b.
Subsection 2
also goes on and says that, mere sales talk or puffing doesn’t lead to a
warranty.
c.
Subsection
1(b)—the more generic the description, the tougher the scope question.
d.
The area of
sample and model: The commentary
isn’t very well conceived in this particular instance.
It is a classic case of substituting categorization for analysis.
Is it a sample or is it a model.
Professor doesn’t see that it makes an awful lot of sense to worry about
this, not clear.
e.
Puffing, and
opinion in and of itself is a very inartful defense.
Subsection 2 of 313 does not say that just because it is an opinion, it
cannot constitute an express warranty.
Much more difficult job to do, must establish that it was merely an
opinion. To a certain extent those
expressions that are merely opinions are not express warranties, but once they
start shading out of that, they are.
Just because it is an opinion, it is no defense, it has to be merely an
opinion. Did it become part of the
basis of the bargain?
2.
Autzen
case
a.
Seller,
‘that’s not an express warranty, Mr. Huhta said it was well intended for it’s
purpose, I did not make these statement and therefore I did not extend an
express warranty.’ The court said
your defense would work beautifully if the buyer had to rest its case on
2-313(1)(a). But the buyer is not
limited to 2-3131(a), 2-313(1)(b) says that any description of the goods can
create an express warranty.
1.
The fact
that we have an express warranty and implied warranty, these are both
warranties. One is not better than
the other. Measure for recovery
whether warranty breach was express or implied is the same
2.
§2-314
Implied Warranty; Merchantibility
a.
The most
important implied warranty is 2-314.
b.
2-314 is
limited to a certain extent, you need to get past the scope provisions (unless
excluded or modified 2-316)…Seller must be a merchant with respect to goods of
that kind. We impose liability on
you simply because of your status.
Strict tort is limited only to injuries of personalty or property.
Where should we leave the ultimate loss.
c.
The warranty
itself is not really defined, it lists 6 different standards joined by the
conjuctive ‘and.’ These are all
standards that must be satisfied, subsection ‘c’ by far the most dominant.
Minimal standards, it defines the floor of what must be met.
3.
§2-315
Implied warranty: Fitness for a particular purpose
a.
2-315,
implied warranty for a particular purpose.
b.
In reality
2-315 is a very narrow warranty.
Most of the claims under 2-315 fail.
The critical point to understand
is that it has to be a particular purpose.
Why do we buy goods? Most
people purchase goods for an ordinary purpose, this is 2-314.
Particular means extraordinary.
c.
Example, you
want to buy heavy equipment, but you want to use it for arctic temperatures.
If a seller gives advice and you take it and use it, then you get the
implied warranty. Most of the time this won’t work because the reason why we buy
goods is for the ordinary argument.
4.
§2-312
Warranty of Title Against Infringement
a.
Signature
feature is a transfer of title from the seller to the buyer.
2-312 is all about warranty of title, goes to the property essence of
what a sales transaction is about.
a.
Does the UCC
even apply to this case? Yes it
does, it applies to food and the food was sold on the premises.
b.
The courts
have followed different rules with respect to a breach with a food product.
i.
Test,
natural v. foreign test. Since fish
bones are natural to the fish used in the chowder, it is not a breach.
ii.
Smarter
analysis, court says a reasonable person should expect fish bones in fish
chowder.
a.
The first
defense asserted by the seller says that the implied warranty of merchantability
doesn’t apply to used goods.
Applicability question-no implied warranty, this is the sale of a used car.
b.
§2-314(1)
this states the standard governing the applicability of the warranty of
merchantability. “If the seller is
a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.”
No exclusion in 2-314(1) for used
goods. The buyer is going to be
able to anticipate less in terms of quality in respect to goods that are used
compared to goods that are new. See
comments.
c.
What
standards of merchantability did the court apply to this case?
2(a) and 2(c), an excellent job.
How is that 2(c) is violated in this case?
This vehicle was not fit for ordinary transportation purposes.
d.
2(a) was
also breached, how—what was the contract description?
It was a used car, if it had been described as a used car modified for
racing purposed, it may have passed muster.
What if the seller could demonstrate that the modifications increased the
value of the car. No difference,
you go out and buy a car, you are not interested in how fast you can burn a
quarter mile, you are probably going to be very angry once you find out about
these modifications. Measure of
damages will be the difference in value of what you were promised and what you
received.
a.
Did the
seller have reason to know? Yes,
the buyer told him. So he has
reason to know, most of the time it is because he communicated such a need.
b.
Did the
buyer rely on the seller’s recommendation?
Yes, he did. The court does
a good job here, applies the facts to each of those necessary elements to
2-315.
This would not work under 2-314,
because it was an ordinary purpose.
The oil delivered was fit for its ordinary purpose, the problem was that it did
not fit for this particular hydraulic system.
1.
§2-318 Third
party beneficiaries of Warranties
a.
UCC doesn’t
really say a great deal about privity, 2-318, they have provided 3 alternatives,
A, B, and C.
b.
A is the
most restrictive, A is far and away the one that has been enacted by most of the
states.
c.
We must have
had a situation where the buyer has a remedy from the seller.
If the seller didn’t give any express warranties, there are no warranties
to move out on the horizontal chain.
What it does is say that whatever warranties express or implied, the
parties listed in this chain of horizontal privity are
beneficiaries. A seller may
not restrict or limit 3rd parties beneficiaries (last sentence).
Whatever warranties flow through, be they express or implied, also go to
the parties in this horizontal privity chain.
d.
These
provisions basically address only the horizontal privity chain.
This is just a promulgated version of a model statute.
A lot state legislatures fashion their own version of 2-318.
e.
A-the most
conservative, C is the most liberalized.
f.
Each
alternatives has 3 separate components:
g.
1st
component-based upon identifying the individuals or entities that can qualify as
the plaintiff
h.
2nd-same
in all 3 versions, requires that such an entity can reasonably be expected to
use or consume or be affected by goods
i.
3rd—type
of element of loss we are talking about.
A |
B |
C |
Natural person in family ,home or guest in home |
Any
natural person |
Any
person |
It
is reasonable to expect that such a person will use, consume or be
affected by the goods |
that
suck a person will use, consume or be affected by the goods |
that
such a person will use, consume or be affected by the goods |
Require that designated person who can reasonably be assumed, must be
injured in person |
Require that designated person who can reasonably be assumed, must be
injured in person |
Injured |
j.
What is the
difference between a person and a natural person?
A natural person is a human being, and a ‘person’ can be a corporation.
Under C these corporations can recover under 3rd party
beneficiary.
k.
A—the
proverbial innocent bystander is not going to be covered.
l.
Alternative
C is not limited to injury in person, it requires just injury.
Not so much for this, but it is partly related, identify 4 different
types of loss for which we can see products liability loss broadened.
i.
Person—direct physical harm
ii.
Property—direct physical harm
iii.
direct
economic loss
iv.
consequential economic loss
a.
Vertical
privity, whom other than the immediate seller of goods is focused on the claim.
Most of the time for breach of warranty you are going to work with the
immediate person you bought it from.
b.
In comment
3—the section in this form is neutral…we’ll let case law evolve on that one.
The case law has been undergoing an evolutionary process.
c.
Most courts
have dropped the barrier for requiring privity where there is personal injury.
d.
Courts are
more divided when the plaintiff’s claim is for economic loss.
e.
With primary
economic loss (loss of value to the product itself), the recent trend it towards
allowing recovery.
f.
Secondary
economic recovery (consequential damages), the courts have a profound split.
3.
Randy
Knitwear
case
a.
b.
There are 2
basic ways in which a seller can limit its exposure with respect to quality of
the product. Sometimes sellers
don’t want to go that far. To the
extent that I breach a warranty, you don’t get all of the warranties afforded by
the UCC, instead we will have an exclusive warranty provided by the agreement.
The other remedy is that you are limited to the purchase price, i.e.
significant factor is getting rid of claim for consequential damages.
c.
Get into a
problem when the manufactures exclude all the code remedies and say that they
will fix or replace any defective parts or labor.
Technically it can’t be a warranty, at best it would fit under
2-313(1)—promise that relates to the goods.
That is not what is involved in this repair situation, this is not
anything that relates to the quality or characteristic of the good.
That problem is addressed in the amended version of article 2.
d.
Advertising
promises: The remote buyer can
receive these, the buyer must have reasonable knowledge of the existence of the
claims and a reasonable expectation that the seller will comply.
e.
Buyer must
be aware. No -313B where the buyer
wasn’t aware of the advertisement. Attached to the garmet it is different, i.e.
a tag, then it is different.
1.
Under what
circumstances would a buyer of goods seek to turn to tort liability?
If he has no warranty claim, or if the defendant has viable defenses
against the warranty claim. In this
case, forget the warranty claim, I want to shift over to the tort claim.
2.
Why might I
be motivated to say, I want to jump over to the tort claim?
a.
I never
bargained for a warranty. Description is so broad or basic I won’t be able to
establish breach.
b.
Express
warranty has expired. I.e. a 30 day
warranty and you widget breaks after 60 days.
c.
Disclaimer
of warranties
d.
The type of
remedy for the breach of warranty may be limited.
e.
Viable
defense due to lack of privity
f.
failed to
require adequate notice of breach of warranty
g.
statute of
limitations, article 2 is from date of sale (6 years), strict tort is only 4
years but generally measured from the date of discovery of defect.
1.
§2-316
Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
a.
allows
parties to disclaim warranties. But
it is very hard to disclaim express warranties.
It is simplistic to disclaim implied warranties, you just have to follow
the rules. Why is it tough, but not
impossible?
b.
2-316(1)-Disclaimers of express warranties
i.
Provides
rule of interpretation, provides rules of conduct that create it and negate it.
ii.
Subject to
the parol evidence rule. It doesn’t
change the basic rule in there.
iii.
I don’t want
some sales person making a high and dry sales offer.
Contract that says no salesperson can make any warranty, then the sales
person takes you to the management office, where the manager gives you a huge
contract.
i.
provides a
predominant basis for which most of these warranties are disclaimed.
ii.
2-316(2)-recognizes
that you don’t have to do it just through express language.
You can also do it by having a disclaimer that is provided by TU, CD, CP,
CU.
d.
Advice, make
sure that the disclaimer is in writing.
Irrespective of whether it is in writing or not, it must mention the
words “merchantability.”
e.
If they are
in writing they must always be conspicuous, or they will fail.
i.
Subsection
(b)—this is just a sensible approach to get rid of cases in which people can buy
into a lawsuit. I want to buy a
ladder and I see that the bottom step is cracked through, I see this and I think
“this is my ticket out.” Policy we
are not going to encourage you to purchase a product with a knowing defect.
Very rare kind of case.
ii.
2.
Dorman v.
International Harvest Case:
a.
Deals with
issue of validity of disclaimer of implied warranty.
b.
2 Questions:
i.
Disclaimer
not enforceable because it is not conspicuous.
ii.
Disclaimer
not enforceable because it is unconscionable.
c.
Court is
dealing with §2-316(2).
d.
Only dealing
with first question
e.
What did the
drafters mean when they used the term conspicuous.
i.
“In which a reasonable person out to
have noticed it.”
f.
The test of
conspicuous is whether attention can reasonably be called to it.
The more attention grabbing factors you use, the more likely you are
going to pass muster on a conspicuous standard.
g.
The basic
criteria here, is that there is nothing wrong with a disclaimer, but we are not
going to allow one party to slip it in past the other party.
h.
Court has
two different lines of reasoning:
i.
Court says
that there is no heading for the disclaimer.
A provision is not conspicuous when there is only slight contrast from
the balance of the form.
ii.
you have
used so much legalese that even a lawyer would have trouble understanding what
you are saying.
1.
Cannot
disclaim express warranties…how can I limit my ultimate exposure to my buyers?
The buyer contracted a lot of things article 2 provides away.
Contract away the warranty side and the remedy side of things.
Often what you see is both of them in tandem.
2.
§2-719
Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy
a.
2-719(1)(b)—first
problem. Sloppy drafting on the
part of the seller would be to indicate your remedy of repair or replacement of
the part, and stop it at that.
Assumption under article 2 that all remedies are cumulative and this would just
add to it. You have to make it
absolutely clear, expressly clear that it is the EXCLUSIVE remedy available to
the buyer.
b.
Revolving
door problem, you buy a car and it has problems but your remedy is to return the
car to the dealer. People have to
return the car to the dealership 10-15 times.
The court is basically saying that it has failed its essential purpose.
1.
After
inspection 3 possibilities:
a.
Buyer is
obligated to accept
b.
Alternatively he can inspect the goods and reject them
c.
Alternatively he accepts the goods but then later rightfully/wrongfully revokes
the goods
2.
Look at the
relationship, the concept of acceptance is the pivotal concept.
a.
Rejection is
pre acceptance behavior.
b.
By
definition revocation is post acceptance behavior.
So acceptance is a big deal.
3.
§2-301
General Obligations of Parties
a.
Obligation
of parties
i.
Duty of the
seller is to deliver goods and transfer title.
ii.
Focus on
buyer’s obligation to accept.
4.
§2-606 What
Constitutes Acceptance of Goods
a.
When we talk
about acceptance you have to mentally shift gears.
We are not talking about offer and acceptance formation here.
No room for formation offer and acceptance, we are talking about the
performance side.
b.
2-606
Acceptance as the seller has imposed a duty upon the buyer.
The duty of the buyer is to accept the goods and to pay them.
c.
2-606 3
different alternatives:
i.
(a)
acceptance through affirmative response from the buyer
ii.
(b) is
acceptance through passive response of the buyer. Failure to make an effective
rejection.
iii.
(2-601
covers right to reject, 2-602 covers how to do it.)
iv.
Subsection
(c)—does any act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership.
Hold off on this for a while.
5.
§2-607
Effect of Acceptance
a.
§2-607-Acceptance is a hugely significant consequence and it spelled out in
2-607, effect of acceptance.
b.
(1) The
buyer must pay at the contract rate for any goods accepted.
If you don’t accept you can’t be forced to pay the contract price.
c.
§2-607(2)-
precludes rejection of the goods accepted.
No such thing as accepting and then rejecting.
You have waived the right to reject once you accept.
d.
§2-607
(4)-burden on the buyer to establish breach.
Ball is in the buyer’s court to a further degree.
e.
There are
some significant consequences of acceptance.
Do not overlook significance of §2-607.
6.
2-709(1)—
Action for the price
a.
spells out a
total 3 circumstances in which a cause of action will lie to recover the full
purchase price. If he accepts and
doesn’t pay, the seller has a cause of action for the full purchase price under
2-709(1)(a). Connection between
2-709 and 2-607.
7.
Zabrinksi
Chevrolet v. Smith
a.
On what
basis did the seller contend that it was entitled to recover here?
The seller claimed that he bought the car and left the lot, so that was
acceptance. If there is acceptance,
2-606(1)(a), so he can’t reject and he must pay.
b.
If
acceptance then can only sue for breach of warranty, will probably be the cost
of repair.
c.
The court
found that there was no acceptance.
No reasonable opportunity to inspect, does this make any sense?
Reasonable opportunity to inspect means just that, an opportunity that is
reasonable.
d.
What if the
buyer had signed a receipt at the time of delivery that said it has received the
car in perfect mechanical condition?
Courts probably will not allow this.
What if what he had signed said that the consumer had inspected the goods
himself? Courts are likely to say
that is okay, we want to make sure that it is a meaningful waiver.
a.
After the
contract, the leasee has to have an opportunity to inspect.
What subsection of 2-606 is the one that is ultimately at issue here?
b.
§2-606(1)(c).
Clearly not 1(a), or 1(b).
We are still on 1(c) it is just that the lease itself did not consist of an act
inconsistent with the seller’s owner ship.
1.
Common law:
You cannot cancel the contract unless it is material breach.
UCC is a quite radical departure.
2.
Reality for
the most common method of rejection, that is 2-601 and that is perfect tender.
3.
§2-601—Perfect Tender (remember right to cure)
a.
Keep in mind
good faith too!
b.
No way to
provide cure for a late tender.
c.
601 the
perfect tender rule—if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in ANY respect…
d.
Parade of
commentators that have lamented the perfect tender rule, saying that there are
so many exceptions that it isn’t really a rule.
e.
What are
these exceptions?
i.
Installment
contract and party wants to reject an installment contract that is governed by
2-612.
f.
There are
limitations on 2-601 and by the time you get through with those limitations
there really isn’t much left.
g.
It will
suspend the seller’s effectiveness of the tender of delivery.
Just because you suspend rejection, it puts the ball in the seller’s
court.
h.
What is
behind the parade of complaints against the perfect tender?
i.
2-601
creates an atmosphere in which we can have great unfairness towards sellers.
Such critics have ignored the most important limitation.
That limitation is the DUTY OF GOOD FAITH.
ii.
The reality
of the situation, if you are an attorney representing a buyer and the buyer
wants to avoid the contract, you need to advise that party whether they can
withstand strict cross examination to have a valid commercial reason for
rejection, but if that market price has fallen you better really have that base
covered.
i.
Doctrine of
substantial performance.
i.
No question
he breached, but it was not a serious enough breach to justify non-payment.
ii.
Although it
is a breach of the promise the contract is satisfied.
j.
So long as
you are acting in good faith you have the substantive right under 2-601 to
reject.
k.
That right
is never self executing. If you
have the right, but you don’t exercise it you are going to
be held to an acceptance under 2-606(1)(b).
l.
If you want
to exercise is you need to follow 2-606(1).
m.
1-205(b)
action is taken seasonably if it is taken at or upon the time agreed upon.
n.
What happens
if only 1 or the other is satisfied?
I have the right to reject, but I don’t act in a timely fashion, or I do
it and I don’t notify the seller?
You will be held to an acceptance down the road.
I incur all the consequences of 2-607 and I have lost my right to reject.
o.
What if the
goods are perfectly conforming, I have no right to reject under 2-601, but I
reject anyway. Now, there is a
wrongful but effective rejection.
2-301 says that I am obligated to accept the goods.
2-607 doesn’t apply to me here, but I have breached the contract and the
code remedies under the UCC will be totally available to the aggrieved seller.
4.
§2-602
Manner and
Effect of Rightful Rejection
5.
§2-603
Merchant
Buyer’s Duties as to Rejected Goods
6.
§2-604
Buyer’s
Options as to Salvage of Rejected Goods
7.
§2-605
Waiver of
Buyer’s Objections by failure to Particularize
8.
§2-508
Cure by
Seller of Improper Tender or Delivery; Replacement
a.
Seller’s
right to cure under section 2-508
b.
Subsection
(2) goes beyond common law, may give breaching seller additional time.
It is a second bite at the apple.
Courts and commentators have not done well with this section.
They try to shove every cure case into 2-508.
2-612 installment contract.
2-608 1 (a) has some aspects.
9.
§1-304
Obligation of Good Faith
10.
§2-612
Installment Contract breach
a.
Not covering
2-612(3), not covering transfer of goods
12.
Myron v.
a.
Which
provision of 2-606 is in issue here? 2-606(b)
b.
As soon as
his trainer discovers the problem with the leg he is on the phone immediately.
c.
Issue: Did
he reject within a reasonable amount of time?
This is less than 24 hours after the sale.
It is going to be really difficult to establish that it is not a
reasonable amount of time.
d.
Court, you
can’t reject if you are too late.
e.
2-714 is a
remedy available, cause of action for breach of warranty.
Difference of what was promised and what was delivered.
13.
Shaken Faith
Doctrine (affecting cure)
a.
Rear axle
example. Likely that the failure of
the rear axle will affect some other components of the vehicle
b.
If there is
a cure provided that doesn’t measure up under 2-601.
Zabriskie the attempted cure by the dealer was ineffective.
The dealer substituted a transmission not from the factory and from an
unknown lineage of a vehicle in its possession.
1.
§2-608
Revocation of Performance
a.
2-608
revocation of performance.
b.
Non
conformity substantially impairs its value to him: 3 elements, non conformity,
substantial impairment (pretty much the same as material breach), to him.
c.
Must also
establish non-conformity
i.
Measured
based upon the impact to this particular buyer, not to a reasonable person.
Substantial impairment to him.
ii.
IF buyer
accepts goods while aware of defect, (a) goes.
iii.
If buyer
accepts goods without having discovered defect then (b) goes.
iv.
(b) can
exert a revocation of acceptance.
2.
§2-607(2)
Effect of Acceptance
D.
Breach and Impaired Expectations
1.
Impairing
party’s expectation. Classic:
anticipatory repudiation.
2.
If you can’t
show that it is clear that you repudiated, then you can get relief but it is not
as expansive.
3.
§2-609 Right
to Adequate Assurance of Performance
a.
2-609
replaces prospective inability to perform.
You have a duty to not impair the other parties expectations of
performance. As long as you have
commercially reasonable grounds for insecurity you can say, ‘clear that up.’
I’m entitled to not have my expectations impaired, but you are doing it,
so clean it up. I demand adequate
assurance that you will clean it up.
4.
§2-610
Anticipatory Repudiation
a.
2-610 covers
the right of anticipatory repudiation and it basically codifies common law.
Must be clear that it is a repudiation.
b.
If they
don’t clear it up by providing adequate assurances, that allows what would be an
anticipatory breach ripens into one.
c.
Section
2-610 on anticipatory repudiation comes into play.
Aggrieved buyer can resort to any remedy, but can do so only when
performance not yet do will substantial impair the buyer’s expectation.
5.
§2-611
Retraction of Anticipatory Repudiation
6.
§2-612(3)
Installment Contract Breach
7.
§2-703
Seller’s Remedies in General
a.
2-703—seller’s remedies in general.
8.
§2-711
Buyer’s remedies in General
a.
2-711—events
of breach spelled out: seller doesn’t make any delivery at all, seller
repudiates, this is anticipatory repudiation, seller delivers or buyer
rightfully rejects because goods to not conform to the contract or buyer
rightfully revokes. Circumstances
which giver rise to a breach by the seller, the seller’s breach triggers the
buyer to have the following remedies.
a.
§2-712
Cover—Buyer’s procurement of substitute goods
i.
2-712 is the
preferred remedy. 2-712 +
2-715.
ii.
Section
2-712—Buyer’s right to cover—preferred remedy for an aggrieved buyer.
iii.
Preference
is cover under article 2. You want
the goods, buy them somewhere else and have the seller pay the difference.
Place the aggrieved buyer in the same economic position he would have
enjoyed had the contract been performed.
iv.
If you pay
more, the basic measure will be increased cover price minus the K price, end up
for the same goods, but pay more for the goods, then we give you the difference
plus incidentals, however all this must
be made in good faith.
v.
First
requirement of cover price: must be reasonable and made in good faith, buyer
behaves honestly and observes reasonable standards of good friend.
If it can be established that the motivation that induced them was
punitive, the buyer must show a rational commercial reason to support this
change.
vi.
Without
unreasonable delay.
If the know the price of carpet increasing is imminent, then the
reasonable time just shrank.
vii.
In
substitution, this is the tough part.
Buyer doesn’t make perfect substitute even though one is available, or
buyer doesn’t have a perfect substitute.
Was carpeting with a 10 year and 15 year warranty available?
What constitutes the cover price may take some adjustments.
viii.What
the court will do is back out the difference of value.
Courts, if you can prove that the increase in quality will benefit them,
then we will listen to evidence to back out the cost, but if you can’t prove
this, we will just use the cover price as is.
2.
Market
Price/Contract Price Differential
a.
§2-713
Buyer’s damages for non delivery or repudiation
i.
Cover does
not qualify then, 2-713-K price market price differential, and again take on
2-715, recovery for other loss, incidental damages.
Remedies available in absence of acceptance of goods.
ii.
2-713, at
least it provides some answers. 2
huge variables, place, and time.
iii.
2-713(1)-provides that market price at time of breach.
What about an anticipatory repudiation?
It has never been resolved.
Most of the time it is place of tender, but it can also be place of arrival as
the marketplace.
3.
When Buyer
Accepts the Goods
a.
§2-714
Buyer’s damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted Goods
i.
If buyer
accepts the goods, then the remedy is 2-714 and add on 2-715.
ii.
Buyer
doesn’t accept, do not use 2-714, use 2-712 or 2-713.
iii.
If the buyer
accepts the goods, you can’t apply 20712 or 2-713.
Your measure of damages will be determined under 2-714(1).
Will be applied to any deficiency except breach of warranty.
4.
Incidental
and Consequential Damages
a.
§2-715
Buyer’s incidental and Consequential Damages
i.
Most action
is under 2-715(2) (b)- injury to person or property, put to one side.
ii.
(a)—basic
requirement here is causation. Must
have certainty, can’t speculate, foreseeability (Hadley v. Baxendale),
mitigation of damages (if you could have taken other action and reduced
other losses you can’t sit on your hands).
Is no duty to mitigate.
a.
§2-716
Buyer’s right to specific performance
i.
UCC:
Specific performance may be declared where goods are unique or in other proper
circumstances. Expands the common
law.
ii.
Other proper
circumstances is the inability to cover.
iii.
The court
does not have to grant it to you, the UCC says “may.”
a.
§2-706
Seller’s resale Including K for resale
i.
Seller does
have corollary monetary damage provisions, 2-706—if the buyer breaches, go out
and sell the goods to somebody else.
2.
Contract
Price/Market Price Differential
a.
§2-708(1)
Seller’s damages for non acceptance or repudiation
i.
2-708(2)—sometimes measure of damages would be inadequate to put seller in
position as if performance has occurred.
a.
§2-709
Action for the price
a.
§2-710
Seller’s incidental damages